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As member states have to negotiate both externally with the
EU and internally with their own regions, European
integration is reaching a point of exhaustion.
by Blog Admin
As the leaders of the major EU member states grope towards a solution to the eurocrisis Bob
Hancké  looks at the impact of the rise of challenges posed to member states’ governments
from regions such as Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders. National governments now not only
have to negotiate with the EU and other member states, but their own increasingly restless
regions and populations.
While the eyes of  the world have been turned to Brussels and the main European capitals in
the last f ew years, something less immediately recognisable, almost subterranean in f act,
seemed to be taking place. Marc Chandler recently pointed out on his blog at Economonitor, that in
Germany, Italy, Spain and Belgium the post-war internal f inancial settlement, based on solidarity between
wealthy and poorer regions, is being challenged at the exact moment that Germany and France are
simultaneously governed by leaders f or whom the European construction as a means of  avoiding a third
war on the continent within one century is no longer the driving f orce behind European integration. Europe
can handle a lot, as we have learned over the past decade and a half : European Monetary Union (EMU),
eastward enlargement, and the move toward a more sustainable, coherent international economic and
def ence and f oreign policy. The EU even seems to be able to design a plan f or a f iscal, banking and
polit ical union to help EMU back on track (touch wood). And it probably will survive a challenge by a more
than Eurosceptic UK to its decision-making structures and the results that these generate.
But the European paradigm, if  we can call it
that, was built on the nation state, and
particularly on the ability of  member states to
discipline internally, through reward and
constitutional stick, in order to negotiate
externally. As long as governments had the
ability to t ie opponents into the non-zero sum
game that the combination of  economic
growth and European integration of f ered, they
were able to hold their ground in international
negotiations. In a now classic article, Robert
Putnam suggested that governments,
everywhere but especially in the EU, always
danced on the edge of  that world, pursuing
strategies in what he called a two- level game:
the space f or governments in international
negotiations was, as it were, a result of  their
ability to project the constraints imposed on
them by their own domestic polit ical system onto their partners in the EU: ‘my voters will not accept that’
was the usual ref rain, ‘and we theref ore need to f ind a settlement that is easier f or me to sell at home’. Yet
if  – admittedly a big but not unconscionable if  – the internal coherence implied by that approach to
international polit ics disappears, and central governments permanently have to negotiate internally as well
as externally, European integration is reaching a point of  exhaustion. There is, in all likelihood, not a single
government that could survive a sustained challenge f rom a wealthy region at home (I do hope you’re not
listening, Catalonia, Flanders, Bavaria and, with apologies to my Italian f riends, Padania).
I don’t know if  this is a new thing going on and if  it  is a new thing going on, although the numbers and
regions are important enough to think about that. A quick back of  envelope calculation on the relative size
of  these regions in their national economies, and extrapolating that across the EU, suggests that 25 per
cent or more of  the EU economy could be held hostage in this way. I don’t know either if  this is a trend — I
can’t predict the f uture any more than readers of  this blog can. But remember that egoism is hardly a new
word in the EU vocabulary, and consider that most of  the wealthy regions have, in their own eyes,
contributed massively to national solidarity since the Second World War. And f inally, don’t underestimate the
endogenous Euroscepticism that Brussels engenders by not always being up to the complex tasks that it
sets itself . By and large, no one has held the ECB and the European Commission responsible f or the crisis
of  the euro when it erupted in 2010; yet the lack of  strategic vision in Brussels and Frankf urt have, to put it
mildly, raised some question marks about the whole idea, even in previously Europhile countries like Finland,
The Netherlands and Germany.
Wherever it is we might be headed, we’re not there yet… In the same worrying way that we were not close
to a euro break-up f our years ago. And that’s exactly what worries me about this idea.
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